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Sometimeswhenachoice ismade, theoutcome isnot
guaranteed and there is only a probability of its occur-
rence. Each individual’s attitude to probability, some-
times called risk proneness or aversion, has been
assumed to be static. Behavioral ecological studies,
however, suggest such attitudes are dynamically
modulated by the context an organism finds itself in;
in some cases, it may be optimal to pursue actions
with a low probability of success but which are asso-
ciated with potentially large gains. We show that
human subjects rapidly adapt their use of probability
as a function of current resources, goals, and oppor-
tunities for further foraging. We demonstrate that
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) carries sig-
nals indexing the pressure to pursue unlikely choices
and signals related to the taking of such choices. We
show that dACC exerts this control over behavior
when it, rather than ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
interacts with posterior cingulate cortex.
INTRODUCTION
An understanding of risk and opportunity is essential for success
and survival, and there has been interest in the neural represen-
tation of risk, probability, and value (Platt and Huettel, 2008). We
know that individuals differ in attitudes to risk and probability. For
example, people prepared to pursue a course of action that
might lead to great potential gain (a large reward magnitude)
even if there is a low probability of obtaining the outcome, are
said to be risk prone, while others are called risk averse. Such
variation in attitudes is linked to individual differences in brain
activity (Tobler et al., 2007, 2009). It is recognized that such atti-
tudes differ depending on the type of prospect contemplated—
for example, whether it is a potential gain or a loss (Kahneman
and Tversky, 2000)—but within a given frame, there has been
less investigation of how the use of probability to guide behavior
changes with circumstances. Despite the existence of individual
differences in risk attitudes, it is possible that how each indivi-
dual evaluates probability also changes with context.
It has been apparent to behavioral ecologists interested in
risk-sensitive foraging theory (RSFT) that dynamic changes in1190 Neuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The Authorsrisk attitudes occur across time within individual foraging
animals (Caraco, 1981; Hayden and Platt, 2009; Kacelnik and
Bateson, 1997; McNamara and Houston, 1992; Real and
Caraco, 1986). For example, during the day, warm-blooded
animals pursue safe but small-sized prey items—those that
they probably will be successful in obtaining but which have a
low food value. However, they may pursue choices that are
riskier but have a higher value as evening approaches and
foraging opportunities for the day decrease. This is particularly
the case if their metabolic resources are low or if they need to
gather enough food to meet a metabolic target to survive a cold
night. In such circumstances, pursuing a safe option associated
with a probable but small magnitude of food is, by evening, of
little long-term value, because it will not be sufficient to guar-
antee the animal’s survival through the night. Instead the animal
should be biased toward riskier options associated with high
magnitudes of food items, even if they have a lower probability
of success. The animal’s attitude to probabilities is, therefore, a
function of its momentary resource budget and its longer term
targets.
From this ecological perspective, decisions are viewed
as occurring within sequences, and there is the possibility of
adapting the decision-making strategy later within such a
sequence depending on the outcomes of initial decisions. There-
fore, when navigating an environment via a sequence of
decisions, riskier choices can be seen as part of a particular
strategy, influenced by past experiences and future prospects.
The first aim of the studywas to test whether dynamic changes
in decision strategy occur in humans as they make a series of
decisions and to see whether they depended on a person’s
current resources as well as longer term targets. Thus, while
our approach borrows from RSFT, it differs from most accounts
of ‘‘risk’’ and gambling prevalent in cognitive neuroscience
because it recognizes that different use of probability—
effectively different decision-making strategies—may be optimal
in different contexts. Some contexts, such as the prospect of the
cold night for the foraging animal described earlier, can be
thought of as exerting a pressure to assume a more risky deci-
sion-making strategy. We refer to this contextual influence as
risk pressure. Note that we use the term ‘‘risk’’ in the sense it
is most commonly used (to refer to a choice’s probability to yield
no gain or a loss) rather than in the way it is sometimes used in
neuroeconomics (to refer to the outcome variance of a choice)
(Platt and Huettel, 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Rushworth
and Behrens, 2008).
Figure 1. Behavioral Task and Results
(A) Trial timeline: at the start of trials, subjects were presented with choices on the left and right of the screen. Each option was composed of a reward probability
(height of purple bar fill) and magnitude (number next to each bar). This was followed by a choice cue (yellow question mark) that instructed subjects to choose.
Subjects chose between a more probable low-magnitude option (safer option) and a less probable high-magnitude option (riskier option) on each trial. After
responding, their choice was highlighted with a white frame, and feedback was shown for both options (both the chosen option and the alternative). If the choice
was rewarded, then points were added to the blue ‘‘current points’’ bar at the top of the screen (white bar indicated added points), progressing it further toward the
target. The number of trials remaining in the block was indicated in the circle at the bottom of the screen. After each trial, the number of remaining trials was
reduced by one. The target turned white if it was reached.
(B) Two examples of progressions through a miniblock. Points accumulated are shown in green, with target level in red (upper panel) and the resulting risk
pressure in magenta (lower panel). In the first example, the target was relatively high, and the risk pressure is highest before a big win after the fourth decision,
when the subject selected the less likely but more valuable riskier option. In the second example, the pressure is lower at first but increases after a series of losses
until it actually exceeds the risk pressure experienced in the other block. nr., number.
(C) Overall proportion of riskier choices as a function of increasing relative value of riskier choice (Vriskier  Vsafer).
(D) Overall proportion of riskier choices split by optimal risk bonus scaling and binned by increasing relative value of the riskier choice (Vriskier  Vsafer).
(E) Differences in proportion of riskier choices (left) between low-level andmidlevel (green and blue, respectively, in D) and (right) between midlevel and high-level
(blue and red, respectively, in D) optimal risk bonus scaling, illustrating how changes in optimal risk bonus scaling are associated with increased frequencies of
riskier choices. Additionally, for the first change, choices with large Vriskier Vsafer value differences are affected more, whereas, for the second change, the more
difficult decisions involving lower Vriskier  Vsafer value differences are more affected. All error bars represent means ± SEM.
See also Figures S1 and S2.
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Neural Mechanisms of Dynamic Risk TakingWe simulated the situation of a foraging animal pursuing an
imperative longer term reward target by asking subjects to try
and repeatedly collect a target number of points over aminiblock
of eight decision trials. Subjects chose between safer ‘‘high
probability’’ options and riskier, but high-magnitude, options
(Figure 1A). Reaching the target meant that subjects kept the
points they won in that block, but failure to reach the target
meant that all points in that eight-trial block were lost. Thus,
the subjects accumulated resources in terms of points, and
with every decision, their foraging opportunities, in terms of trials
left in the block, decreased. It is important to note that the safer
choice normally had, on average, a higher value (on six of eighttimes, it had the higher expected value [probability3magnitude]
and, in general, it was preferred by participants). However, if a
subject takes into account the sequential structure of the task
as well as the contextual factors—i.e., the target level, their
current level of resources, and the number of trials left—then it
should motivate them to take the riskier choice instead. This is
because, even if it is successful, the safer choice sometimes
yields insufficient points to reach the target.
Our analysis focused on relating decisions and brain activity
recorded with fMRI to two types of variables. The first type
concerned specific decisions that participants made and the
choice values that motivated those decisions. This part of theNeuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The Authors 1191
Figure 2. Logistic Regression of Riskier
Choices against Parameters Defining Each
Decision
(A) GLM incorporating relative value of riskier
choice (Vriskier  Vsafer), number of trials already
performed in the current block (trial number, nr.),
and risk pressure. Increases in both Vriskier  Vsafer
and risk pressure were associated with significant
increased riskier choices. The constant term from
the GLM, however, indicates a bias against
riskier choices (left bar with negative value). a.u.,
arbitrary units.
(B) An alternative analysis used risk bonus
(reflecting the model-based impact of the current
risk pressure on Vriskier  Vsafer); again, increases
in this term were associated with significant
increases in riskier choices. All error bars repre-
sent means ± SEM.
See also Figures S3 and S4.
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Neural Mechanisms of Dynamic Risk Takinganalysis often concerned the relative values of riskier and safer
choices (V = value; Vriskier  Vsafer). In the past, relative value
signals have been used to identify neural mechanisms of deci-
sion making (Boorman et al., 2009; Camille et al., 2011; De
Martino et al., 2013; Fellows, 2011; FitzGerald et al., 2009;
Hunt et al., 2012; Kolling et al., 2012; Lim et al., 2011; Noonan
et al., 2010; Philiastides et al., 2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012).
The second type of variable focused on the gradually changing
context as participants moved through the block. For this, we
estimated three key parametrically varying quantities. First, trial
number indexed how far through the block the subject had pro-
gressed. Second, risk pressure was the difference between the
subject’s current resources and the imperative target scaled by
the remaining foraging opportunities (Equation 1; Figure 1B).
Risk pressure should lead to a contextual modification of the
options’ values. Using a model, we formalized the amount of
optimal modification in a given trial through the third key
term: risk bonus (Equation 6), the degree to which risk pressure
should optimally bias a person away from the safer choice,
given the current offers’ magnitudes and probabilities, as well
as future decision opportunities. Further information about the
regressors is provided in Experimental Procedures and in the
Supplemental Experimental Procedures available online. All
the regressors used in a given whole-brain analysis shared
less than 25% of their variance, making it possible to identify
variance in the fMRI-recorded activity related to each (Fig-
ure S2). The fMRI analysis focused on two frontal areas, ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC), implicated in decision making (Hare et al.,
2011; Kolling et al., 2012).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Subjects had a baseline tendency toward risk aversion, but they
took more risky choices as risk pressure increased. This is
apparent when trials are binned into four levels according to
the Vriskier  Vsafer value difference and the frequency of riskier
choices is plotted (Figure 1C). Overall, participants were less
likely to take riskier choices at all levels of Vriskier  Vsafer1192 Neuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The Authorsdifference, but the effect was smaller when the value difference
for Vriskier  Vsafer was larger.
The frequency of riskier choices can be examined not just as a
function of the Vriskier Vsafer value difference but also as a func-
tion of optimal risk bonus scaling, which is one of the parameters
derived from our model that expresses the approximately
optimal degree to which participants should be biased toward
riskier choices as risk pressure increases independent of the
specific options presented in the trial (Figure 1D). Three equally
sized bins of trials were created using the optimal risk bonus
scaling factor for a trial. Within each level of optimal risk bonus
scaling, we examined the effect of the Vriskier Vsafer value differ-
ence. Participants took more risky choices when Vriskier  Vsafer
value difference was larger, even when the optimal risk bonus
scaling was lowest. On trials with little or no optimal risk bonus
scaling, participants did not, on average, prefer riskier choices,
even when the Vriskier  Vsafer value difference was high (there
was no significant preference with a one-tailed t test against
0.5; see Figure S1). However, when optimal risk bonus scaling
was high, participants began taking more risky choices, even
when the Vriskier  Vsafer value difference was in the lower
midrange. A change in optimal risk bonus scaling from low levels
to midlevels (Figure 1E, left) and from midlevels to high levels
(Figure 1E, right) is associated with an increased frequency of
taking riskier choices. In the first case, decisions with large
Vriskier  Vsafer value differences are affected, whereas in the
second case, the more difficult decisions involving lower
Vriskier  Vsafer value differences are more affected.
We tested whether the frequency of riskier choices was simply
driven by Vriskier  Vsafer value differences or whether it also
reflected the risk pressure associated with the context in which
the decision occurred, using a logistic regression analysis (see
the Behavioral Analysis section in Experimental Procedures).
The Vriskier  Vsafer value difference exerted a significant influ-
ence, t(17) = 4.48, p < 0.001, but this is obviously expected, given
that our estimates of the subjects’ values are based on their
choices (Equation 2). What is important to note, however, is
that it was not sufficient to explain choices; risk pressure exerted
an additional effect, t(17) = 6.88, p < 0.001 (Figure 2A). An alter-
native logistic regression looked at riskier choices as a function
Figure 3. DecisionMaking in the Absence of Risk Pressure and Task
Progression Effects
(A) Decreasing risk bonus was associated with increased vmPFC activity. The
impact was present, regardless of subjects’ choices.
(B) Activity increases in dACC and elsewhere during the decision phase as
number of trials remaining decreased.
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Neural Mechanisms of Dynamic Risk Takingof the risk bonus on each trial (this term expresses how the rela-
tive value of the riskier option as opposed to the safer option
changes as a function of risk pressure and the option’s specific
magnitudes and probabilities; Equation 5). The risk bonus on a
trial exerted a significant impact on riskier choice frequency,
t(17) = 9.03, p < 0.001 (Figure 2B). Note that both analyses
included a negative constant term (negative-going bar on the
left side of Figures 2A and 2B, in form of the intercept of the
regression model); this means that subjects were biased against
riskier choices and that their default approach was to take safer
choices, although they did so less when the Vriskier  Vsafer value
difference or risk pressure was higher. Figure S3A shows the
results of another logistic regression that incorporates both the
regressors shown in Figures 2A and 2B.
Another way to examine how participants shifted away from a
baseline tendency to risk aversion is to compare their behavior to
the predictions of our model, which, as already noted, makes
decisions that are close to optimal. Participants were more likely
to make model-conforming safer choices than they were to
make model-conforming riskier choices (Figure S4B). However,
riskier choices were still more likely than not to conform to model
predictions. This means that, even though participants were not
completely optimal, they integrated over choice value and
contextual factors in a way predicted by our model, with a slight
overall bias against the riskier option.
RESULTS
Contextual Modification of Value
To look at the impact of context, we split all trials into those
where the context meant that there was a risk bonus and those
where there was none (see Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures). First, we looked at the main effect of the risk bonus, in
other words, we looked at the model-based modification of
each trial’s option values away from the default safer choice in
favor of the riskier choice as a result of risk pressure. We
observed a relative decrease in vmPFC activity as risk bonus
increased that was independent of which choice, riskier or safer,
subjects ultimately made (Figure 3A). In other words, vmPFC
activity is negatively related to the risk bonus. Beyond this
choice-independent decrease, we were unable to find anychoice-related value signals, either ‘‘raw’’ ones (Equation 2) or
contextually modified ones (Equations 3, 4, and 5) (such as an
absolute or relative chosen value signal). This is in stark contrast
tomost other studies that have suggested that vmPFC codes the
value or relative value of potential or attended choices (Boorman
et al., 2009; De Martino et al., 2013; FitzGerald et al., 2009; Hunt
et al., 2012; Kolling et al., 2012; Lim et al., 2011; Philiastides et al.,
2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012). In summary, while vmPFC may
normally track choice values during decision making, it does
not do so in the current paradigm, in which both immediate value
and current risk bonus had to be integrated to make appropriate
choices. Instead, vmPFC’s activity decreased if the context
meant that there was a risk bonus, and subjects increasingly
biased their decisions toward the riskier choice and away from
the default of taking the safer choice.
Sequential Progression and the Generation of Riskier
Choice Decisions
Progression through the eight-trial miniblocks had a strong
impact on activity in dACC and other regions (Figure 3B).
Crucially, in addition to this effect, dACCwas sensitive to another
piece of information more directly related to the decision
strategy that subjects used; its activity was correlated with risk
pressure, the average points per trial needed to reach the target
(Figure 4C). However, the effect of risk pressure on dACC activity
reversed depending on choice. A positive effect of risk pressure
on dACC activity was apparent when subjects chose the safer
option, whereas a negative effect was apparent when subjects
chose the riskier option. In other words, dACC activity increased
with increasing risk pressure when choices went against the
prevailing risk pressure but decreased with increasing risk
pressure when subjects chose in agreement with risk pressure
(Figures 4C and 5A).
The dACC risk pressure signal cannot be explained away as a
signal-indexing approach toward a reward that might be deliv-
ered at the end of the block (Croxson et al., 2009; Shidara and
Richmond, 2002), because progress through the sequence of
trials itself was present as a separate regressor in the general
linear model (GLM) and associated with an independent effect
on dACC activity (this is the effect already shown; Figure 3B).
The risk pressure signal cannot be explained away as a conse-
quence of differing average reward expectations associated
with different target levels because the use of a ‘‘multiplier’’
procedure (see the Experimental Task section in Experimental
Procedures) ensured that average reward expectations were
the same at the beginning of a block regardless of the target. It
is, however, the case that expectations about the reward that
would be received at the end of the block (as opposed to just
after the current trial within the block) began to diverge as
soon as participants began to make choices and were either
lucky or unlucky. However, when we included an additional
term in the GLM indexing the expected value of the reward at
the end of the block we found that it had an independent effect
on dACC activity (Figure 5B). No similar signal was observed in
vmPFC (Figure S6). In summary, dACC exhibited a number of
signals related to progress through the sequence of decisions,
the expected reward at the end of the sequence, and a risk pres-
sure signal indexing the need to take riskier choices as a functionNeuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The Authors 1193
Figure 4. dACC at Decision I
(A) When just the main effect of choice is considered, then activity in dACC and adjacent dorsomedial frontal cortex increased for riskier as opposed to safer
choices.
(B) Again, the same dACC region and adjacent dorsomedial frontal cortex exhibited increased activity as a function of the relative value of riskier choices (Vriskier
Vsafer).
(C) dACC activity during the decision phase increased as a function of risk pressure when subjects did not succumb to it and insteadmade riskier rather than safer
choices.
(D) In (i), the dACC group time course of the Vriskier Vsafer effect is shown separately for riskier (continuous line) and safer choices (dotted line). In (ii), subjects who
were less biased against riskier choices exhibited a higher dACC Vriskier Vsafer effect at the peak of the group time course. a.u., arbitrary units; RT, reaction time.
See also Figure S5.
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Neural Mechanisms of Dynamic Risk Takingof contextual factors (accumulated resources, target, and
remaining foraging opportunities). The risk pressure signal
flipped with the decision strategy that subjects pursued (safer
versus riskier); it was positive when subjects needed to change
their behavior and switch to riskier choices as opposed to the
default safer choice.
In addition to these contextual effects, the same dACC region
also exhibited activity that was tied to specific patterns of choice
and choice valuation. dACC activity was higher in decisions in
which the riskier rather than the safer choice was taken
(choiceriskier choicesafer; Figure 4A). Not only did themain effect
of the choiceriskier  choicesafer difference activate dACC, but so
did the relative value of the riskier choice (Vriskier  Vsafer; Fig-
ure 4B). Moreover, the signal encoding the Vriskier  Vsafer value
difference was stronger on trials on which subjects actually
took the riskier choice, although it was also present when sub-
jects took the safer choice (Figure 4Di). Individual variation in
the Vriskier  Vsafer signal size at the group peak coordinate in1194 Neuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The AuthorsdACC when taking the safer choice was related to how
frequently subjects took the riskier choice (Figure 4Dii), suggest-
ing that variation in this aspect of dACC activity is intimately
related to decision making.
Activity increases related to the choiceriskier  choicesafer
contrast were also apparent in the inferior frontal gyri (IFG) and
frontal operculum (Table S1), while the Vriskier  Vsafer contrast
was also associated with activity in posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC) (Figure 4B; Figure S5) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC). We propose an explanation of IFG and PCC activity in
a later section. In summary, one region—dACC—encoded five
features of the task: (1) the expected reward at the end of the
sequence of decisions, (2) progress through the sequence of de-
cisions, (3) risk pressure, (4) taking riskier choices but not taking
safer choices, and (5) the relative valueof the riskier choice versus
the safer choice. The time course analyses shown in Figures 4D
and 5 are all from the same region of interest with Montreal
Neurological Institute coordinates x = 2, y = 28, and z = 36.
Figure 5. dACC at Decision II
(A) The risk pressure signal in dACC increased
when subjects did not act in accordance with it,
but it had a negative effect when subjects did act
in accordance with risk pressure and took the
riskier option. a.u., arbitrary units.
(B) Independent of choice (riskier or safer), higher
expected value at the end of the block, as esti-
mated using our model, was related to increased
dACC activity.
See also Figure S6.
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why the impact of risk pressure on dACC activity changed
depending on whether subjects acted in accordance with it or
not, it is worth considering that it may reflect the operation of
an evidence accumulation process to threshold that finally
results in a riskier choice being taken. This would be consistent
with the observation that actually taking a riskier choice activates
dACC (Figure 4A), as does the evidence advocating such a
choice (Vriskier  Vsafer; Figure 4B). If an accumulation process
is taking place before riskier choices are generated, then it seems
that risk pressure increases such activity (Figure 4C). However,
once such a process has hit its bounds, triggering the taking of
a riskier choice, further activity increases related to the risk pres-
sure are not observed. Although there is evidence for the opera-
tion of accumulation processes in dACC (Hayden et al., 2011;
Kolling et al., 2012), further experiments are needed to determine
whether risk pressure is contributing to such a process.
In the past, another region, the lateral frontal pole (FPl), has
been associated with tracking the values of alternative courses
of action (Boorman et al., 2009, 2011). FPl activity also increased
as a function of Vriskier  Vsafer value difference (Figure 6), and
individual differences’ signal strength were related to individual
differences in the degree to which subjects modulated their
behavior according to the model-based risk bonus (Figure 6Bii).
Unlike in dACC, FPl signals tracking risk pressure and Vriskier 
Vsafer value difference were apparent regardless of which choice,
riskier or safer, subjects took (Figures 6C and 6D). In other
words, FPl provides a constant signal, regardless of current
choice type, of how necessary it is to adjust choice strategy
away from the default safer choice and toward the riskier choice
in the face of risk pressure.
Outcome-Related Signals
So far, we have shown that dACC is more active when a riskier
choice, as opposed to a safer choice, is made (Figure 4A) and
that dACC activity reflects the relative value of riskier choices
(Figure 4B) and risk pressure (Figure 4C). Next, we consider
whether dACC also contains signals related to evaluation of
the success of riskier choices when their outcomes are revealed.
Subjects can update their estimate of risk pressure or the likeli-
hood that they will reach the target when they see the outcome
of their choice. Therefore, we tested whether dACC activity
was related to changes in risk pressure at the time of outcome
presentation.To do this, we plotted the effect of decision outcome on dACC
activity after safer and after riskier choices. In addition, we also
binned the outcome effects according to three levels of the
change they caused to risk pressure. In other words, we exam-
ined the effect of two factors, choice type (riskier versus safer)
and the size of impact of outcome on risk pressure (three levels:
low, medium, and high). There was a significant interaction
between the two factors on outcome-related dACC activity,
F(2, 34) = 3.417, p = 0.044. As the outcome’s impact on risk pres-
sure increased, so did the outcome’s impact on dACC activity,
but this was only the case when riskier choices were taken (Fig-
ure 7, right). After safer choices (Figure 7, left), there was no in-
crease in the impact an outcome had on risk pressure (in fact,
if anything, there was a slight decrease). The results remained
the same even after controlling for the expected value of the
whole block, F(2, 34) = 4.352, p = 0.021, and outcome surprise,
F(2, 34) = 3.848, p = 0.031. At the time of outcomes, dACC is not
only simply encoding prediction errors in value (Jocham et al.,
2009; Kennerley et al., 2011; Matsumoto et al., 2007) but also
the impact that riskier choices have on reducing risk pressure.
Functional Connectivity and Networks of Choice
A large body of work has implicated vmPFC in reward-guided
decision making, but it was deactivated in the current experi-
ment when the subject’s context meant that the default safer
choice should not be taken and the riskier choice should be
taken instead (risk bonus effect; Figure 3). By contrast, dACC
activity increased with risk pressure and was greatest when
subjects chose the riskier choice (Figure 4). Therefore, it seems
that the two frontal brain regions, vmPFC and dACC, may
mediate decisions in different situations. If there are two systems
competing to control behavior, then it is not clear how the
competition is resolved or if there is any critical area that
mediates both types of decisions.
One region that may be a nexus for both types of decision
modes is the PCC. In many neuroimaging studies, it carries a
value difference signal like that seen in the vmPFC (Boorman
et al., 2013; FitzGerald et al., 2009; Kolling et al., 2012). However,
a series of single-neuron recording studies have emphasized the
similarities between the parameters that both it and dACC
encode (Pearson et al., 2011), and in the current study, it, like
dACC, was sensitive to the relative value of riskier choices
(Vriskier  Vsafer) (Figure 4B). The PCC region that was active in
this contrast probably includes areas 31 and 23, but it alsoNeuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The Authors 1195
Figure 6. FP at Decision
(A) The FPl carried a Vriskier  Vsafer signal regardless of which choice subjects ultimately made.
(B) In (i), the group time course of the Vriskier Vsafer signal (regardless of whether riskier or safer decisions were made) is shown. In (ii), individual subject Vriskier
Vsafer signal effect sizes at the peak of the group time course predicted individual behavioral sensitivity to risk bonus. a.u., arbitrary units.
(C) The Vriskier  Vsafer signal was present in FPl both for riskier choices (continuous line) and safer choices (dotted line).
(D) Risk pressure activated PFl similarly for riskier choices (continuous line) and safer choices (dotted line).
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Neural Mechanisms of Dynamic Risk Takingincludes the caudal cingulate motor areas that lie in the cingulate
sulcus at the point of its inflection into its marginal ramus (Amiez
and Petrides, 2012; Beckmann et al., 2009). In macaques, the
caudal cingulate motor area projects to both the primary motor
cortex and ventral horn of the spinal cord (Dum and Strick,
1996), so it may be involved in making the movement needed
for implementing a particular choice. In macaques, it is
connected to the dACC, vmPFC, and adjacent parts of PCC
(Parvizi et al., 2006; Van Hoesen et al., 1993), so it is, therefore,
a region through which vmPFC, dACC, and PCC might interact
and influence action movement selection.
We conducted a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) test of
whether vmPFC and dACC activities were coupled with PCC
activity in different ways as a function of choice (riskier or safer)
and their relative values (Vriskier  Vsafer). There was greater
coupling between dACC and PCC as a function of Vriskier Vsafer
value difference but only when the riskier choice was chosen
(Figure 8B). In other words, PCC’s coupling with dACC increases
as a function of the decision variable, Vriskier  Vsafer value differ-1196 Neuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The Authorsence, which predisposes participants to take riskier choices (Fig-
ures 1 and 2) and which influences dACC activity (Figure 4). By
contrast, vmPFC was more coupled with PCC when the default
safer choice was taken and as a function of risk bonus being low
(Figure 8A). In other words, PCC’s coupling with vmPFC
increased in inverse relationship with the decision variable risk
bonus. The inverse of risk bonus was associated both with lower
vmPFC activity (Figure 3A) and with higher frequencies of taking
the default safer option (Figures 1 and 2). PCC carries signals
that are more similar to either vmPFC or dACC, depending on
the prevailing context at the time of each decision and
depending on the choice that subjects actually took (for the
coupling pattern of the ventral striatum, see Figure S7).
Finally, we looked for evidence of a brain area that might
resolve competition between dACC and vmPFC and determine
which one couples with PCC. We focused on IFG because we
had noticed that its activity changed with choice in the current
experiment, even though it did not carry a value signal
(discussed earlier), and because it has been argued that it or
Figure 7. The Effect of Outcomes on Activ-
ity in the dACC after Riskier or Safer
Choices
The effect of outcomes is not only dependent on
choice (riskier or safer) but also on how much
impact they have on future risk pressure (greater
on the right than on the left of each panel).
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activity in other situations (Baumgartner et al., 2011; Hare
et al., 2009). We carried out a further PPI analysis that, once
again, tested vmPFC-PCC and dACC-PCC coupling, but this
time, we examined vmPFC-PCC and dACC-PCC coupling as a
function of IFG activity. PCC’s coupling with dACC versus
vmPFC was related to IFG activity when the riskier choice was
chosen (Figure 8C). In other words, with increasing IFG activity,
the relative strength of dACC-PCC coupling increased (which
was also, as described earlier, a function of the Vriskier  Vsafer
value difference) as opposed to vmPFC-PCC coupling (which
was also, as described earlier, a function of low risk bonus).
Such a pattern of results is consistent with a controlling function
for IFG, not just of activity in other brain regions but also of the
interconnectivity between other brain regions. A clear demon-
stration of the causal direction of effects, however, would require
showing that IFG disruption affected the coupling patterns.
DISCUSSION
Dynamic Changes in the Use of Probability
Instead of assuming that attitudes to probabilities reflect stable
individual differences, a behavioral-ecological approach to
decision making suggests that animals should adapt decision-
making strategies as a function of their current resources,
resource targets, and the opportunities that remain for foraging
(Caraco, 1981; Hayden and Platt, 2009; Kacelnik and Bateson,
1997; McNamara and Houston, 1992; Real and Caraco, 1986).
We argue that these factors can be integrated to determine the
current risk pressure—the degree to which it might be adaptive
to adjust decision making toward pursuit of low probability but
potentially large reward magnitude outcomes. The combination
of risk pressure with the precise values of the specific options
that might be chosen in a given decision determine a risk
bonus—an increase in value that accrues to the low probability
but potentially large magnitude option in a decision. We
designed a decision-making task for humans (Figures 1A and
1B) that manipulated these factors, changing resource levels,
target levels, and opportunities for further foraging. Human
subjects were sensitive to risk pressure and the risk bonus;
increases in each factor led to more frequent riskier choices
(Figures 1 and 2). Although we think that our approach of adding
a risk bonus to the values of choices that are made in the contextNeuron 81, 1190–120of risk pressure provides an intuitive way
to think about how decision-making
strategies can be rapidly updated, there
are, nevertheless, links between several
of the concepts used in our approach
and those that can be derived from areinforcement learning-based approach (Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures).
We demonstrated a neural correlate of continuous tracking of
changing context that, in turn, impacted on evaluation of specific
choices. The approach is, however, complementary to norma-
tive approaches that have described how preferences are ex-
pressed and updated. There is a link to previous studies that
have shown that subjects often have biases toward certain deci-
sions and that activity in some brain regions is associated with
taking decisions that do not conform with the default strategy
(Venkatraman et al., 2009a, 2009b).
Individual differences in risk-taking behavior may, in extreme
cases, be associated with pathological gambling (Clark and
Limbrick-Oldfield, 2013). While pathological gambling may be
linked with a baseline change in risk proneness/aversion, our
results raise the possibility of a link with individual differences
in how decisions are influenced by context. An approach
focusing on changing sensitivity to contextual factors such as
risk pressure may elucidate aspects of developmental change
in risky behavior (Blakemore and Robbins, 2012; Paulsen et al.,
2012). Assaying response strategies with low likelihoods of
success but with the potential for delivering great gains may
be imperative at some points in adolescence.
Neural Systems for Decision Making
VmPFC and dACC might constitute two distinct decision-
making systems rather than components of a single serial
system for decision making (Boorman et al., 2013; Kolling
et al., 2012; Rushworth et al., 2012). There was evidence that
vmPFC and dACC acted in independent, or even opposite,
ways in the current study.
Although there has been particular interest in the role that
vmPFC plays in valuation and decision making (Boorman et al.,
2009; Camille et al., 2011; De Martino et al., 2013; Fellows,
2011; FitzGerald et al., 2009; Hunt et al., 2012; Kolling et al.,
2012; Lim et al., 2011; Noonan et al., 2010; Philiastides et al.,
2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012), vmPFC did not mediate the
influence of the contextual variable of risk pressure on decision
making. Instead, vmPFC became less active as risk bonus
increased (Figure 3A). Both lesion and neuroimaging evidence
suggest that, in addition to its role in valuation and decision
making, vmPFCmediates the repetition of a previously success-
ful choice or the taking of a default choice (Boorman et al., 2013;2, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The Authors 1197
Figure 8. PPI Analyses Demonstrated vmPFC and dACC Interactionswith PCC during Different Types of Decisions and the Relationship with
IFG Activity
(A) Time course illustrating PPI between PCC and vmPFC as a function of decreasing risk bonus on trials when the safer option was taken. a.u., arbitrary units.
(B) Time course of PPI between PCC and dACC as a function of Vriskier  Vsafer value difference on trials on which the riskier option was chosen (dotted line).
(C) Time course of a PPI on PCC, using the IFG signal and the different effects of vmPFC and dACC, the two regressors from (B) and (A), respectively.
(D) Illustration of effects in (A)–(C). The PCC couples with dACC and vmPFC during decisions in which the riskier option (red) and safer option (green) were taken,
respectively. Left IFG may regulate PCC’s interactions with the vmPFC and dACC by increasing the relative degree of coupling to the former as opposed to the
latter during riskier choices.
See also Figures S7 and S8.
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vmPFC suggests that it was similarly concerned with default
responses in the present task. This interpretation is suggested
by the following observations. On average, subjects were risk
averse and defaulted to taking the safer choice. This was most
true on trials in which the risk pressure was low (Figures 1 and
2), and it was on just such trials that vmPFC activity was greatest
(Figure 3A). Note that, in this task, default choices occur when
decision making is less constrained by context.
Instead of vmPFC, both dACC and FPl were preeminent in
tracking the risk pressure afforded by the evolving decision
context (Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7). FPl and dACC have been
coactivated in other studies (Boorman et al., 2011; Daw et al.,
2006); together, they constitute another neural system important
for decision making. In macaques, frontal pole (FP) and dACC
are monosynaptically interconnected (Petrides and Pandya,
2007). There is evidence that FPl, unlike medial FP, is only found
in humans and not in other primates but that it remains inter-
connected with dACC (Neubert et al., 2014).1198 Neuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The AuthorsIn FPl, signals indicating both risk pressure and Vriskier  Vsafer
value difference were present, regardless of the choice (riskier or
safer) subjects took. By contrast, in dACC, both signals changed
as a function of choice, and the taking of riskier choices was
associated with additional activity (Figures 4 and 5). These
observations suggest that dACC was more closely related to
the actual decision to take a specific riskier option, while FPl
had a more consistent role in tracking the contextual variables
that guided decisions. Individual variation in the sizes of both
FPl and dACC signals were predictive of subjects’ sensitivities
to the risk bonus and their predispositions to make riskier
choices (Figures 4Di and 6Bii). Individual variation in the
Vriskier  Vsafer signal in dACC, when the safer choice was taken,
predicted how frequently subjects rejected the default safer
choice and took the alternative riskier option. This is consistent
with the idea that, when one course of action is being pursued
or is the apparent default course of action, dACC is tracking
the value of switching to an alternative (Kolling et al., 2012; Rush-
worth et al., 2012). In a previous study, dACC also encoded the
Neuron
Neural Mechanisms of Dynamic Risk Takingrelative value of switching away from the current default choice
to explore a foraging environment (Kolling et al., 2012). An
‘‘inverse value difference’’ signal is often seen in dACC (Kolling
et al., 2012; Rushworth et al., 2012); when a decision is being
made, dACC activity increases as the value of the choice not
taken increases, and it decreases as the value of the choice
that is taken increases. This signal is opposite to the one seen
in vmPFC. One simple interpretation of the dACC inverse value
signal is that it is encoding the value of switching away from
the current choice to an alternative one.
So far, we have focused on dACC signals that are recorded at
the time when decisions are made, but dACC activity is also
observed subsequently at the time of decision outcomes.
Outcome-related dACC signals can also be interpreted in a
similar framework and related to the need to switch away from
a current choice and to explore alternatives (Hayden et al.,
2009, 2011; Quilodran et al., 2008).
A notable feature of dACC activity in the present study was
that, unlike vmPFC activity, it reflected the longer term value
of a course of action, progress through the sequence of deci-
sions, and the evolving level of risk pressure (Figures 3B, 4C,
and 5). Boorman and colleagues (2013) have also argued that
dACC reflects the longer term value of a choice and not just
its value at the time of the current decision that is being taken.
Not only does dACC carry signals related to the longer term
and contextually modified value of a choice, but it also
encodes the approximate value of a number of potential alter-
native courses of action (Kolling et al., 2012). By contrast,
vmPFC is more concerned with the valuation of specific
aspects of specific choices. Value-related activity in vmPFC
is most prominent when the choices’ values are determined
by multiple attributes and when it is necessary to identify the
attribute currently most relevant for guiding a choice (Fellows,
2006; Hunt et al., 2012).
One prominent account of dACC function has emphasized its
role in detecting response conflict (Botvinick, 2007). Although
some features of the dACC results are consistent with the
response conflict account, other features, such as the value
difference signal (Vriskier-Vsafer) in dACC are not easy to interpret
within the framework offered by the conflict account; the dACC
Vriskier-Vsafer signal encodes the relative value of the riskier choice
as opposed to the safer choice but it was stronger when that very
same choice, the riskier choice, was being made and when,
because of its relatively greater value, the decision should
have been relatively easy to take.
PCC as a Final Common Pathway for Decision Making
It has not previously been clear how the two distinct decision-
making mechanisms associated with vmPFC and dACC might
interact. The present study suggests that PCC is part of a final
common pathway to action selection used by both systems.
The PCC region probably included areas 31 and 23, but it
extended to the main branch of the cingulate sulcus at the point
of its inflection into its marginal ramus (Figure 4B), where the
caudal cingulate motor area is situated (Amiez and Petrides,
2012; Beckmann et al., 2009). Activity in this region, or just
caudally, has been reported to resemble both that in vmPFC
(Boorman et al., 2013; FitzGerald et al., 2009; Kolling et al.,2012) and that in dACC (Pearson et al., 2011). In our study, it
was more closely coupled with vmPFC when risk bonus was
low and the safer choice was taken, but it was more closely
coupled with dACC when the riskier choice was taken and
when the relative value of the riskier choice (Vriskier  Vsafer)
increased (Figure 8). In other words, the region that PCC couples
with during a decision is related to the signal it carries and the
choice that subjects ultimately make. This means that, while
there may be two parallel decision-making circuits dependent
on dACC and vmPFC, both circuits have a serial element that
converges in, or just posterior to, the caudal cingulate motor
area in PCC.
Crucially, the competition between the twomechanisms asso-
ciated with vmPFC and dACC was modulated by a third frontal
region, the IFG (Figures 8 and S8). The IFG has often been iden-
tified with executive control (Swann et al., 2009), and the current
results suggest that one way in which it might exert control is to
regulate the relative activity in two parallel systems for decision
making and the manner in which they interact with PCC. How
exactly IFG is involved in the evaluative process itself is still
unclear. Our results suggest that, if it has a causal role in pro-
moting nondefault riskier choices, then its disruption would
lead to taking safer, default choices. In agreement with the pos-
sibility that IFG or an adjacent lateral frontal region is involved in
dynamic, context-dependent changes in decision making, one
recent study applied transcranial magnetic stimulation in this
vicinity and found that subjects were more likely to make socially
unbiased decisions and to integrate considerations of reward
magnitudes in the standard manner (Baumgartner et al., 2011),
rather than taking the social context into consideration.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Eighteen subjects (nine women and nine men), aged 22–36 years, completed
the task. They were paid £10 plus a performance-dependent bonus of
between £15 and £30. Ethical approval was given by the Oxfordshire National
Health Service Research Ethics Committee (local ethics code: 07/Q1603/11).
Training
Before fMRI scanning, every subject was instructed in the task and played a
shorter version of the task used in the fMRI experiment for about 10 min.
Experimental Task
The behavioral task in the scanner consisted of 24 blocks, each composed of
eight trials (192 decisions in total) in which the subjects had to decide between
a safer option with a higher reward probability but a lower reward magnitude
and a riskier option with a potentially higher reward magnitude but lower
reward probability. There were eight decisions, and they were each presented
once in each block in a randomized order that varied. In this way, we were
conclusively able to show that dynamic changes in decisions occur, because
of sensitivity to risk pressure, even when the exact same options were pre-
sented. Risk pressure varied because all eight decisions were associated
with different values and were presented in different orders, with different out-
comes, and in the context of different block target values (which the subjects
had to reach in order to keep the points they won during the block).
Four target levels were used in the experiments. The different target levels
helped ensure that risk pressure (see Introduction and the following section)
had some parametric range. To equalize expected gains at the beginning of
a block regardless of target level and to keep motivation relatively stable, we
introduced a ‘‘multiplier,’’ which was displayed on top of the ‘‘target’’ line.
The multiplier indicated a factor that would be used to multiply the pointsNeuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The Authors 1199
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the target. We chose the multiplication factor by applying our model
(discussed in the next section) to generate equal expected gains at the first trial
of a block. Simply put, if a participant had a high target to reach, all his points
were multiplied (e.g., by 2) if he managed to reach it. Therefore, the subject
should be equally motivated to perform the task when the targets were high,
because the average payouts were similar. The use of the ‘‘multiplier’’
procedure ensured that the risk pressure signal that we observed (Figure 4)
could not be explained away as a consequence of differing average reward
expectations associated with different target levels. Further information about
the experimental task and fMRI scanning is provided in the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures.Behavioral Analysis
As explained in the Introduction, the target manipulation and block structure
allowed us to compute three contextual variables. Trial number indexed how
far through the block the subject had progressed. The second variable, risk
pressure, indexed how many points a subject needed to gain on average on
each remaining trial in order to reach the target. Risk pressure thus took into
consideration the subject’s resources (the points they had earned prior to
any given decision), the target number of points that had to be acquired in
order to keep any earnings from the block, and the number of remaining
foraging opportunities minus the number of trials that remained in the block.
Risk pressure= ðtarget points points already earnedÞ=
trials remaining in block
(1)
In order to understand how risk pressure exerted an influence of decision
making, it is first necessary to consider the relative value of riskier and safer
options in the absence of any contextual modification. Vriskier Vsafer, the value
difference favoring riskier as opposed to safer choices, was calculated as
follows:
Vriskier = normalizedðmagnituderiskierÞ+ normalizedðprobabilityriskierÞ (2i)
Vsafer = normalizedðmagnitudesaferÞ+ normalizedðprobabilitysaferÞ: (2ii)
This is because we noticed that subjects acted as if they approximated Vriskier
andVsafer by linearly combining eachoption’s componentmagnitude andprob-
ability rather than multiplying them as would be optimal (Figure S1). Neverthe-
less, there was a correlation (r > 0.86) between the value regressors we used
and those we would have used had value been estimated multiplicatively.
Note that both parameters (magnitudes and probability) were, separately,
normalized by subtracting each mean and dividing by each SD. Finally, it is
important to note that, while we follow convention in referring to these terms
as ‘‘values,’’ it is, of course, the case that these values are inferred from sub-
jects’ choices. Therefore, they are likely to be predictive of choices, but the
question we investigate here is whether they are sufficient, in isolation, to
explain choices or whether other contextual factors also influence decisions.
We, therefore, built amodel examining the process of valuemodification due
to contextual factors such as risk pressure. At its heart is the idea that, in the
absence of risk pressure, it is optimal to combine information about both the
probability and magnitude of a reward outcome associated with a choice
but that, with increasing risk pressure, decision making should be guided
increasingly by just the potential reward magnitudes at stake. Although we
are not wedded to the precise parametrization of the model, the general aim
of the approach is to find a principled and quantified way of modifying the
decision rule, going from the unmodified decision rule that combines both
reward probability and magnitude to a rule based exclusively on magnitudes.
In the model, we use a parameter—the risk bonus scale—with scores
ranging from 0 to 1 as the decision rule is changed from the unmodified
version to the increasingly contextually modified version. We think that such
adjustments of a decision rule provide an intuitive way to think about how
an agent adjusts their behavior in a new situation. The contextual
parameter risk bonus scale therefore captured the insight that participants
should opt for the riskier choice, even if its associated reward probability
was low, if it was going to be difficult for them to reach the block’s
target level in the absence of that reward. At a risk bonus scale score of 0,1200 Neuron 81, 1190–1202, March 5, 2014 ª2014 The Authorsthere is no modification of the option values shown in Equation 2. At a risk
bonus scale score of 1, the options’ values corresponded solely to their
magnitudes.
The changes in the options’ values were formalized by adding an option
bonus to each option’s raw value. This allowed estimation of a simple quantity
that corresponded to howmuch an option’s value increased for a given level of
risk pressure. The size of the option bonus depended on both (1) the risk
pressure on a given trial but also on (2) the specific raw value of the option.
The dependence on the specific raw value that each option possesses
follows from the fact that high reward magnitude options, even when associ-
ated with low probabilities, have greater utility for reaching the target at the
end of the decision sequence. The option bonus for a specific option A is
calculated as:
option bonusA = risk bonus scale3 ðmagnitudeA magnitudeA
3probabilityAÞ:
(3)
The term in parentheses on the right side of Equation 3 can be thought of
as an option-specific component of the option bonus. It is the difference
between the number of points that could potentially be gained from that
option (its magnitude) and the average points expected from that option
(magnitude 3 probability; note that the product of magnitude and probability
corresponds to the average value of the options under this optimal
model). We used the option bonus to calculate modified model values of the
options:
modified model valueA = ðMA 3PAÞ+option bonusA ; (4)
whereMA and PA correspond to themagnitude and probability, respectively, of
reward associated with option A. Alternatively, themodified value option A can
be written as follows:
modified model valueA = ðMA 3PAÞ+ risk bonus scale  ðMA  ðMA 3PAÞÞ
or, again, alternatively as:
modified model valueA = ðMA 3PAÞ+ ðrisk bonus scale 3 ðMA 3 ð1 PAÞÞÞ;
and decisions should be made as follows:
if (modified model valueA > modified model valueB), then choose A;
else if (modified model value < modified model valueB), then choose B.
So far, we have explained how the risk bonus scale was used in conjunction
with the option’s reward probability and magnitude to estimate an option
bonus for each option. It is necessary now to explain how the optimal risk
bonus scaling itself was calculated. We simulated, for every trial, all unique
decision sequences, each associated with a different risk bonus scale by
calculating their modified values and using the aforementioned decision rule
(Figure S3). For every unique decision sequence, generated with our value
modification model, we could compute an end of block expected value. We
defined the optimal risk bonus scaling as the risk bonus scale, which led to
the decision sequence with the highest end of block value. It is important to
note that, when doing so, we took into account that all net outcomes that
fell short of the target value had a value of 0. Although we do not assume
that participants were able to track the exact optimal risk bonus scaling, it
served as an approximation of how the values of specific choices should be
modified as a result of the context on a given trial. Task parameters were
chosen to maximize its parametric range.
It is, furthermore, possible to calculate the risk bonus scale that leads to the
point of equivalence for a given pair of options. In other words, at an optimal
risk bonus scaling equal or above this value for an option pair, the riskier option
should be preferred:
equivalence risk bonus_scale= ðMS3PS MR3PRÞ=
ðMR3 ð1 PRÞ MS3 ð1 PSÞÞ
or
equivalence risk bonus_scale= ðMS3PS MR3PRÞ=
ððMR MSÞ  ðMR3PR MS3PSÞÞ
; (5)
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riskier and safer options and reward probabilities associated with the riskier
and safer options, respectively.
By computing this value for all remaining decisions and rank-ordering deci-
sions from the least to the most risky, we could estimate the value of all unique
decision sequences and select the one that led to the highest end of block
value. In all neural and behavioral analyses, the risk bonus scale used is, there-
fore, equal to the optimal risk bonus scaling in a given trial, i.e., the risk bonus
scale that generates a sequence of future decisions that would lead to the
highest expected value at the end of the block, taking into account the current
context (risk pressure) and future prospects (set of options left and the pair
presented).
The optimal risk bonus scaling is, therefore, a contextual parameter reflect-
ing the degree of bias toward riskier choices that is optimal for a given context
and applies to both options in a trial in the same way. The option bonus
becomes larger for riskier choices, compared to safer choices, as the optimal
risk bonus scaling increases, reflecting the riskier choices’ increased utility for
reaching the target. Therefore, the option bonus can be understood as a
combination of risk pressure to take a riskier choice and features of the specific
option at hand.
Finally, we used one more parameter that we refer to as risk bonus (as
distinct from optimal risk bonus scaling), which was used in neural and behav-
ioral analyses. This was the difference in value modification in favor of the
riskier choice compared to the safer choice. It was calculated using the optimal
risk bonus scaling as:
Risk bonus=option bonusriskier  option bonussafer: (6)
Therefore, risk bonus reflects the relative change in value of the riskier
choice, compared to the safer choice, which occurs as a function of risk pres-
sure and the magnitude and probability characteristics of both choices in a
given trial. We note that, in this regard, our model is an optimal model that
serves to motivate definitions of terms but that real subjects may not be
completely optimal. For example, if, instead, option bonuses were only
adjusted as a function of their reward magnitudes (rather than as a function
of both reward magnitudes and probabilities; Equation 3) then the resulting
risk bonus regressor would be correlated at r = 0.96 with the regressor that
we used.
In summary, the approach allows us to (1) examine decision making in the
context of the varying impact of risk pressure and (2) conceive of the impact
of risk pressure as a quantifiable modifying influence on a default decision-
making process. However, we explore an alternative approach in the Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures that considers how an agent with sufficient
experience of a set of contexts may use a reinforcement learning model to
estimate the values of choices. A number of links between the approaches
are identified and discussed.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
eight figures, and one table and can be found with this article online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2014.01.033.
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